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Abstract: Provision of adaptive access control is key to allowing users harness the full potential of ubiquitous 
computing environments. In this paper, we introduce the M-Zones Access Control (MAC) process, which 
provides user-centric attribute-based access control, together with automatic reconfiguration of resources in 
response to the changes in the set of users physically present in the environment. User control is realised via 
user-specified policies, which are analysed in tandem with system policies and policies of other users, 
whenever events occur that require policy decisions and associated configuration operations. In such a 
system users’ policies may habitually conflict with system policies, or indeed other users’ policies; thus, 
policy conflict detection and resolution is a critical issue. To address this we describe a conflict 
detection/resolution method based on a policy precedence scheme. To illustrate the operation of the MAC 
process and its conflict detection/resolution method, we discuss its realisation in a test bed emulating an 
office-based ubiquitous computing environment. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Ubiquitous computing systems typically employ a 
greater range of user interfaces than traditional 
computing environments; for example, communal 
displays, voice-based command interfaces, and 
gesture recognition systems. The presence of such 
interfaces heightens users’ awareness of, and 
requirements for, privacy protection measures. 
When using such interfaces, users may desire that 
the system automatically reacts to the presence 
and/or activities of other individuals in their physical 
vicinity – typically so that their privacy concerns are 
addressed. In such cases the process of defining 
what actions need to be taken will depend on the 
relationships between a user and these other 
individuals. Furthermore, a user’s access rights 
should be determined based on ongoing analysis of 
the access rights and activities of other individuals 
present in his/her environs. 
In this paper we investigate how a management 
system for a ubiquitous computing environment can 
control access rights in a manner that adapts to the 
changing profile of the set of individuals present, or 
active, within a physical space. We see context 
information, particularly location and presence, as a 
key trigger for the reconfiguration of services and 
resources in order to adapt user access rights and 
protect user privacy. We adopt a user-centred 
approach, in which users are afforded the 
opportunity to define their own policies, which 
embody their preferences for actions to take place 
based on changes in the user set present in their 
vicinity. User policies could address the presence of 
specific individuals, individuals with specified roles, 
or individuals possessing specified access rights. For 
example, in an office environment, a user may wish 
to ensure that guests are never given the opportunity 
to view commercially sensitive information. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we 
briefly review previous work on access control 
approaches in ubiquitous computing environments, 
focussing in particular on approaches for automatic 
detection and resolution of conflicts that may arise 
between access policies that users or administrators 
wishes to deploy simultaneously. We then describe 
the operation of the M-Zones Access Control 
(MAC) process, which, through use of XACML, 
provides for adaptive attribute-based access control 
with conflict detection/resolution, and is integrated 
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with a policy-based management system to allow for 
the reconfiguration of services and resources to 
protect user privacy. We outline the implementation 
of the MAC process in a test bed emulating an 
office-based environment, and describe its operation 
in the context of a specific use case scenario. 
Finally, we summarise the benefits of the proposed 
approach. 
2 ACCESS CONTROL IN 
UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Ubiquitous computing environments are generally 
understood to contain hardware resources providing 
a wider range of command and information delivery 
interfaces than provided by traditional computer 
consoles. The nature of these resources can mean 
that managing them in cases where users can 
simultaneously request access to them can be a 
complex task. Typically, only a single user can 
control operation of resources such as projectors at 
any given time and access to them must be 
controlled in a manner consistent with system 
policies and user preferences. Indeed, the user-
centred focus of ubiquitous computing environments 
suggests that users should, within limits, have the 
ability to adjust access rights for themselves and 
others as they desire (Kagal et al. 2001), thereby 
realising a more dynamic access control system, that 
adapts to changing user needs. 
Many systems employ role-based access control, 
in which users are assigned one or more roles, 
typically mapping to functions in an organisational 
hierarchy, with each role being associated with a 
defined profile of access permissions. Whilst 
offering flexibility and relatively low management 
overhead, it can be argued that this approach does 
not provide the fine-grained control required in 
many ubiquitous computing applications. 
Additionally, it is difficult to apply it effectively in 
cases where resource competition conflicts occur 
when access is required by identical organisational 
roles. To overcome these drawbacks, access control 
decisions can instead be based on specific attributes 
associated with a user, rather than on the user’s 
identity or assigned role(s). This approach is at the 
core of the eXtensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XACML) (Godik and Moses 2003), 
which has been used to provide access control in 
systems such as Cardea (Lepro 2003).  
Ideally, access control solutions would 
automatically adjust access rights based on the 
changing context in which users are requesting 
access to resources – this is known as context-based 
access control. From an access control perspective, 
user location, presence of a group of users in a 
location, the relationship between the users within 
such groups, and the particular activities users are 
engaged in, are probably of most relevance. Basing 
access control decisions on this kind of information 
is an important research topic presently; for 
example, Corradi at al. (2004) have developed 
UbiCOSM, a context-centric access control 
middleware that assigns access rights taking into 
account context, user profiles and system/user-level 
authorisation policies. Also, Sampemane at al. 
(2002) address aspects of context-based access 
control for ubiquitous computing environments, 
describing a system that changes access rights 
depending on the set of users and the activity being 
undertaken in a physical space. 
Based on the above observations we conclude 
that access control systems for ubiquitous computing 
environments should be: 
− user-centric: allow users the freedom to adjust 
access rights as their needs evolve; 
− attribute-based: access control decisions should 
be based on evaluation of appropriate user 
attributes, not rigidly on their identity or pre-
assigned role(s); 
− context-driven: access rights should be 
dynamically assigned based on analysis of 
context information provided by the environment. 
To realise these properties we employ a policy-
based management approach in which access rights 
assignment, as well as resource configuration based 
on access rights, is achieved through context-driven 
analysis of system and user-specific policies. In such 
a system, an important consideration is how to detect 
and resolve conflicts that are likely to occur in 
certain operational contexts between user and 
system policies and/or between policies specified by 
different users. Before introducing our access 
control process, we briefly discuss recent work on 
policy conflict detection and resolution, identifying 
the most appropriate approach for our system. 
2.1 Policy Conflict Detection and 
Resolution 
Conflicts between policies occur if, at any given 
time, the behaviour mandated by those policies 
cannot be simultaneously expedited. For example, 
one policy may oblige a user to take a certain course 
of action at a certain time, whilst another policy may 
forbid the user, at all times, access to a resource 
required to take this course of action. Policy 
conflicts are often broadly classified as being static 
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or dynamic (Lupu and Sloman 1999, Dunlop et al. 
2003); static conflicts can be detected in advance (at 
“compile time”), whereas dynamic conflicts are 
dependant on “run time” state and thus cannot be 
detected in advance. 
Conflict detection involves the identification of 
actual or potential policy conflicts. Methods for 
automatic conflict detection focus on analysing all 
policies relating to particular subject/action/target 
tuples and identifying whether the there is a conflict 
between the modality of these policies. Policies are 
generally constructed to reflect the obligation, 
permission and prohibition modal operators of 
deontic logic, thus modality conflicts are exhibited 
by policy pairs that, for a given subject/action/target, 
indicate behaviour that is prohibited vs. allowed, 
obliged vs. prohibited or obliged vs. not obliged. 
Other kinds of conflict detection, in particular those 
relating to the semantics of the policies, are 
significantly more difficult to detect automatically. 
Once potential policy conflicts have been 
detected, a decision must be made as to whether to 
seek to resolve the conflict, with this decision being 
application-specific, but typically related to the 
probability of occurrence of the identified conflict. 
Two approaches to conflict resolution are possible: 
revoke, re-specify and re-deploy offending policies, 
or let the system assign precedence levels that 
dictate which of the conflicting policies are actually 
invoked. The latter approach is more practical, and 
researchers have investigated/adopted numerous 
schemes for assigning policy preference, for 
example see (Lupu and Sloman 1999, Dunlop et al. 
2003). For example, precedence can be assigned 
based on: specific policies overriding general 
policies; newer policies override older policies; 
policies specified by a higher authority overriding 
those specified by lower authorities; negative 
policies overriding positive policies and vice versa; 
or explicit assignment of policy weights to govern 
precedence. These schemes all have strengths and 
weaknesses, but it is agreed that none is suited for 
use in all application scenarios. 
In our case, policies can be authored by 
individual users, as well as by administrators of 
systems. Sets of users in a physical space are likely 
to have policies with the potential to conflict with 
each other, and/or with system policies. We envisage 
policy conflict detection and resolution being 
performed every time the set of users in a space 
changes (as users enter/leave), or as the activities 
they are performing change (for example, a project 
meeting commences in a meeting room). We view 
the former as a form of static conflict detection and 
the latter more as dynamic conflict detection. We see 
conflict resolution based on higher authorities 
overriding lower authorities as the most appropriate 
scheme in our scenario: system policies are given 
precedence over user policies, and between users 
precedence is based on users’ profile, including their 
current roles within the space. User roles are 
assigned in accordance with system policies and 
may change over time. For example, in a meeting 
context, a user may be assigned a speaker role when 
he/she is detected as standing on a podium, and 
system policies will dictate that speakers have 
control over the projector, lights and other resources. 
In this case that user’s policies relating to, for 
example, lighting settings, will have precedence 
over those of other users. 
3 M-ZONES ACCESS CONTROL 
(MAC) PROCESS 
The M-Zones access control solution we propose has 
been realised in the context of a “Ubiquitous 
Management Architecture” (UMA) (Barrett et al. 
2004), developed as part of the M-Zones research 
programme (M-Zones 2005); which approaches 
management of ubiquitous computing environments, 
specifically smart spaces, by introducing the concept 
of “Managed Zones” (M-Zones) corresponding to 
administrative domains encompassing one or more 
distinct smart spaces. The UMA adopts a policy-
based management approach to facilitate intra- and 
inter- smart space management, with policy decision 
points (PDPs) organised in two levels, following the 
hierarchical approach described in (Ghamri-
Doudane et al. 2004). The PDP at the upper 
(M-Zone) level is responsible for all high level 
policies relating to the administration of the smart 
spaces. At the lower (smart space) level PDPs and 
PEPs control the discovery and execution of 
services. Ongoing decision making relating to access 
rights occurs at the M-Zone level, with access rights 
being communicated to individual smart spaces in 
the form of access control lists, which are enforced 
by the local PDP and PEPs. 
There are two other UMA components involved 
in access control: the Context Information Manager 
(CIM) and Personal Information Managers (PIMs). 
The CIM is responsible for gathering, aggregating 
and semantically enhancing context information 
subscribed to by the M-Zone PDP and notifying the 
M-Zone PDP when context changes occur. Each 
user has associated with him/her a PIM, which stores 
their user profiles, preferences and policies, and also 
acts as their interface to the system. Operation of the 
CIM and PIMs is described in (Barrett et al. 2004). 
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3.1 MAC Process Operation 
The MAC process is responsible for reaching access 
control policy decisions and for collating relevant 
information from other UMA components needed to 
inform these decisions. Access rights are assigned 
based on policies relating to the smart spaces 
themselves – “system” policies, and “user” policies 
(retrieved from the PIMs of users currently present 
in the smart space), in response to context change 
events notified by the CIM. 
The MAC process is realised via a XACML 
policy engine (Sun Microsystems 2005), which 
allows for reaching policy decisions on the basis of 
the values arbitrary user attributes – which in our 
case are stored in user PIMs, or values of attributes 
of the environment itself (as notified by CIM context 
events). As well as re-configuring access rights, the 
MAC process analyses whether user policies 
indicate that specified actions be requested as a 
result of the notified event. For example, users may 
desire that configuration actions be taken to protect 
their privacy in the presence of users unknown to 
them. Once the process has been completed PDPs at 
the smart space level are forwarded new access 
control lists to be enforced for users currently in the 
space, and configuration actions generated from 
analysis of user policies. 
Figure 1 below outlines the flow concerning the 
access control decision mechanism implemented by 
the MAC process. The MAC process subscribes to 
the relevant components (PIM/CIM) in order to be 
notified should an event that requires access control 
decisions. Events that are typically monitored 
include the entry/exit of users or the changing of an 
attribute value that was considered as a condition of 
an active policy. When a user enters the smart space 
in question the MAC process retrieves the relevant 
user policies from the respective PIM. Static policy 
conflict detection is then carried out with respect to 
system and user policies in order to eliminate 
redundant policies and (re-)deploy the relevant 
policies. The MAC process then evaluates the 
respective access rights for the resources in question. 
This is achieved through iterating through the 
applicable policies governing the specific resources. 
Should the event the MAC process has been notified 
of concern the change in the value of a relevant 
attribute, this again necessitates the identification of 
relevant polices and iteration through the various 
polices in order to reconfigure the access rights 
concerned. 
Central to the success of the MAC process in 
providing an adaptive access control is its ability to 
detect and resolve conflicts between various user 
and system policies. The MAC process extends the 
XACML policy engine’s policy conflict/detection 
resolution facilities to realise configurable policy 
precedence schemes, by allowing specification of 
sets of attributes based on which precedence can be 
evaluated. Thus, how a scheme is implemented will 
be environment-specific, but will be based on 
appropriate attributes, for example security levels, or 
date/time. Our implementation targets an office 
environment (see §4.1), and ranks policies based on 
the resource in question, the policy author’s 
organisation role, policy author’s project affiliation, 
policy author’s smart space role (for example, 
presenter) and the project context in which resource 
is being accessed. 
Figure 1: MAC Process Flow Chart. 
Proceedings of 7th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems, ICEIS, Miami, May 24-28 2005 
 
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE 
STUDY 
Figure 2 below illustrates the test bed in which the 
MAC process has been deployed. For the test bed, 
the Ubiquitous Management Architecture has been 
partially deployed onto the TSSG/O2 Home of the 
Future ubiquitous computing environment 
(TSSG/O2 2005). Access to resources and services is 
managed through the policy-based management 
system described in (Ghamri-Doudane 2004), which 
is based on the COPS-SD protocol. 
 
Figure 2: Test bed Architecture. 
The test bed consists of a number of PEPs 
controlling household devices by means of UPnP, 
Jini and proprietary approaches to service discovery 
and resource access. PEPs have COPS-SD wrappers 
to allow them communicate with their smart space 
PDP. Access to devices in the test-bed is ultimately 
controlled by the M-Zone PDP’s MAC process, 
which uses COPS-SD to inform the smart space 
PDP of access rights to enforce. To test the 
operation of the MAC process a COPS-SD wrapped 
PEP was developed; this PEP controls a HP 
projector – the device used to realise the office-
based use case scenario as described in §4.1. 
The PIM has been implemented as a web service 
to host the user profiles. When a user initially enters 
an M-Zone they provide a link to their PIM, which 
will then be queried for the credentials required for 
authentication. The PIM also acts as a repository for 
user policies, including those dictating desired 
actions in the presence of other users. The PIM 
provides notifications to the M-Zone PDP if user 
attributes or policies are modified by a PIM, as, in 
many cases, these modifications will necessitate 
reconfiguration of access policies, or generation of 
new configuration action requests. 
Context notifications, specifically user location 
and presence information are generated using the 
Ubisense simulator software (Ubisense Ltd. 2005), 
which has been used to model the movement of 
individuals along predefined paths through an office 
environment equipped with ultra-wideband (UWB) 
location detection. The current CIM implementation 
passes on context notifications as requested by the 
M-Zone PDP, expressing them in ontological terms 
understood by the MAC process. In the future the 
test-bed will be further developed to allow the CIM 
implementation gather information from a real 
Ubisense UWB location detection system, as 
opposed to simulated data. 
4.1 Office-based Access Control Case 
Study 
We now discuss a use case scenario in order to 
illustrate the MAC process functionality, in 
particular, how access rights adapt to the changing 
user set present and how policy conflicts are 
handled. The scenario concerns a meeting room 
owned by Company X, in which a projector service 
is used by meeting participants. 
Bill is a project manager and Alice is an 
accountant; both are assigned to the M-Zones 
project, and are conducting a meeting together, in 
which Alice is presenting the project accounts using 
the projector service. Both have been previously 
authenticated and authorised regarding the various 
services, including the projector service, available in 
the meeting room smart space. Bill has defined a 
policy which permits all users to use the projector 
service at all times. On the other hand Alice has 
specified a policy that denies her access to the 
projector service should a non M-Zones project 
member enter the room. This is to prevent 
unauthorised users seeing sensitive financial 
information relating to the project, so, if a guest 
enters the meeting room her access to the project is 
revoked, thus her presentation will be immediately 
removed from the projector. Clearly, these policies 
conflict with each other. However the precedence 
scheme for the meeting room is configured such that 
policies specified by a user currently presenting and 
thus a presenter smart space role and accountant 
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organisational role always have precedence over 
policies specified by a user that has a manager 
organisational role and an audience smart space role, 
thus in this case Alice’s policy is enforced. This 
contrasts with typical “Higher Authority Overrides 
Lower Authority” based approaches where policies 
specified by users higher in the company hierarchy 
have precedence over those specified by users lower 
in the hierarchy (which would favour Bill in our 
scenario). 
Bob, a guest, now enters the meeting room. The 
MAC Process receives notification via the 
subscription/notification agreement it has with the 
CIM. The notification triggers the assignment of 
access rights to the new entrant based on system 
policies and any relevant policies of other users in 
the space. In this case the MAC Process examines 
the relevant policies governing access to the 
projector service. This leads to a conflict between 
Bill and Alice’s policies. The precedence scheme 
employed favours Alice’s policy as outlined above; 
thus her own access to the projector service is 
revoked, and the projector is blanked before Bill has 
a chance to see any potentially sensitive information. 
5 SUMMARY 
This paper has outlined an approach to access 
control in ubiquitous computing environments that 
realises adaptive, attribute based access control, 
based on analysis of both, system and user-defined 
policies. It harnesses context information relating to 
the user set present in a physical space and the 
context in which resources are accessed, as inputs 
into the access right configuration process. 
Furthermore, based on preferences specified in user 
policies, it supports automatic configure of resources 
in response to changes in the profile of this user set. 
Policy conflict detection and resolution is also 
addressed: a resolution scheme based on 
configurable assignment of policy precedence based 
on arbitrary attributes relating to both users and 
environmental context was described. 
The approach allows the organisation 
administering the ubiquitous computing infra-
structure to set policies governing default access 
rights associated with users, but also gives users 
themselves scope to dynamically modify access 
rights of others and to ensure that the environment is 
automatically configured to ensure their privacy is 
protected. Management functionality is therefore 
partially the responsibility of the user, resulting in a 
more user-centric system that adapts to changing 
user needs, but not in a manner that violates system-
wide policies. 
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